690427:0812 Update Infras #01
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---
title: Two-Phase File Upload + ClamAV (ADR-016)
impact: CRITICAL
impactDescription: Upload → Temp → ClamAV scan → Commit → Permanent. Whitelist + 50MB cap. StorageService only.
tags: file-upload, clamav, security, adr-016, storage
---
## Two-Phase File Upload (ADR-016)
**Never write uploaded files directly to permanent storage.** All uploads must go through:
```
Client → Upload endpoint → Temp storage → ClamAV scan → Commit endpoint → Permanent storage
```
---
## Constraints (non-negotiable)
| Rule | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Allowed MIME types | `application/pdf`, `image/vnd.dwg`, `application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document`, `application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet`, `application/zip` |
| Allowed extensions | `.pdf`, `.dwg`, `.docx`, `.xlsx`, `.zip` |
| Max size | 50 MB |
| Temp TTL | 24 h (purged by cron) |
| Virus scan | ClamAV (blocking) |
| Mover | `StorageService` only — never `fs.rename` directly from controller |
---
## Phase 1: Upload to Temp
```typescript
@Post('upload')
@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, ThrottlerGuard)
@UseInterceptors(FileInterceptor('file', {
limits: { fileSize: 50 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 50 MB
}))
async uploadTemp(
@UploadedFile() file: Express.Multer.File,
@CurrentUser() user: User,
): Promise<{ tempId: string; expiresAt: string }> {
// 1. Validate MIME + extension (defense in depth)
this.fileValidator.assertAllowed(file);
// 2. Scan with ClamAV
const scanResult = await this.clamavService.scan(file.buffer);
if (!scanResult.clean) {
throw new BusinessException(
`ClamAV rejected: ${scanResult.signature}`,
'ไฟล์ไม่ปลอดภัย ระบบตรวจพบความเสี่ยง',
'กรุณาตรวจสอบไฟล์และลองใหม่อีกครั้ง',
'FILE_INFECTED',
);
}
// 3. Save to temp (encrypted at rest)
const tempId = await this.storageService.saveToTemp(file, user.id);
return {
tempId,
expiresAt: addHours(new Date(), 24).toISOString(),
};
}
```
---
## Phase 2: Commit in Transaction
The business operation (e.g., creating a Correspondence) promotes temp files to permanent **in the same DB transaction**.
```typescript
async createCorrespondence(dto: CreateCorrespondenceDto, user: User) {
return this.dataSource.transaction(async (manager) => {
// 1. Create domain entity
const entity = await manager.save(Correspondence, {
...dto,
createdById: user.id,
});
// 2. Commit temp files → permanent (ACID together with entity)
await this.storageService.commitFiles(
dto.tempFileIds,
{ entityId: entity.id, entityType: 'correspondence' },
manager,
);
return entity;
});
}
```
If the transaction rolls back, temp files remain and expire in 24h — no orphaned permanent files.
---
## StorageService Contract
```typescript
export interface StorageService {
saveToTemp(file: Express.Multer.File, ownerId: number): Promise<string>;
commitFiles(
tempIds: string[],
target: { entityId: number; entityType: string },
manager: EntityManager,
): Promise<FileRecord[]>;
purgeExpiredTemp(): Promise<number>; // called by cron
getPermanentPath(fileId: number): Promise<string>;
}
```
---
## ❌ Forbidden
```typescript
// ❌ Direct write to permanent
fs.writeFileSync(`/var/storage/${file.originalname}`, file.buffer);
// ❌ Skip ClamAV
await this.storageService.savePermanent(file);
// ❌ Non-whitelist MIME
@UseInterceptors(FileInterceptor('file')) // no size or type limit
// ❌ Commit outside transaction
const entity = await this.repo.save(...);
await this.storageService.commitFiles(tempIds, ...); // race: entity exists, files may fail
```
---
## Reference
- [ADR-016 Security & Authentication](../../../../specs/06-Decision-Records/ADR-016-security-authentication.md)
- [Edge Cases](../../../../specs/01-Requirements/01-06-edge-cases-and-rules.md) — file upload scenarios