690517:1449 204 and 302 refactor #03

2026-05-17 14:49:45 +07:00
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+---
+name: security-review
+description: Comprehensive security review for LCBP3-DMS with OWASP Top 10 checklist, ADR compliance, and automated security testing patterns.
+version: 1.9.0
+scope: security
+depends-on: []
+handoffs-to: [speckit-reviewer, speckit-security-audit]
+user-invocable: true
+---
+
+# Security Review Skill
+
+Comprehensive security review for LCBP3-DMS ensuring all code follows security best practices and identifies potential vulnerabilities.
+
+## LCBP3 Context
+
+See [`_LCBP3-CONTEXT.md`](../_LCBP3-CONTEXT.md) for project-specific security requirements:
+- **ADR-016**: Security & Authentication (JWT, CASL, RBAC, file upload)
+- **ADR-018**: AI Boundary (Ollama on Admin Desktop only, no direct DB/storage access)
+- **ADR-019**: UUID Strategy (no parseInt/Number/+ on UUID)
+- **ADR-023**: Unified AI Architecture (AI via DMS API only)
+- **ADR-007**: Error Handling (layered error classification)
+
+## When to Activate
+
+Invoke this skill:
+- Implementing authentication or authorization
+- Handling user input or file uploads
+- Creating new API endpoints
+- Working with secrets or credentials
+- Integrating AI features (Ollama/Qdrant)
+- Storing or transmitting sensitive data
+- Integrating third-party APIs
+
+## Security Checklist
+
+### 1. Secrets Management
+
+#### FAIL: NEVER Do This
+```typescript
+const apiKey = "sk-proj-xxxxx"  // Hardcoded secret
+const dbPassword = "password123" // In source code
+```
+
+#### PASS: ALWAYS Do This
+```typescript
+const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY
+const dbUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL
+
+// Verify secrets exist
+if (!apiKey) {
+  throw new Error('OPENAI_API_KEY not configured')
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] No hardcoded API keys, tokens, or passwords
+- [ ] All secrets in environment variables
+- [ ] `.env.local` in .gitignore
+- [ ] No secrets in git history
+- [ ] Production secrets in QNAP docker-compose environment section (not .env files)
+
+### 2. Input Validation
+
+#### Always Validate User Input
+```typescript
+import { z } from 'zod'
+
+// Define validation schema
+const CreateCorrespondenceSchema = z.object({
+  subject: z.string().min(1).max(500),
+  recipientId: z.string().uuid(),
+  typeCode: z.string().min(1).max(50)
+})
+
+// Validate before processing
+export async function createCorrespondence(input: unknown) {
+  try {
+    const validated = CreateCorrespondenceSchema.parse(input)
+    return await correspondenceService.create(validated)
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof z.ZodError) {
+      throw new BadRequestException(error.errors)
+    }
+    throw error
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### File Upload Validation (ADR-016)
+```typescript
+function validateFileUpload(file: Express.Multer.File) {
+  // Size check (50MB max per ADR-016)
+  const maxSize = 50 * 1024 * 1024
+  if (file.size > maxSize) {
+    throw new BadRequestException('File too large (max 50MB)')
+  }
+
+  // Type check (whitelist: PDF, DWG, DOCX, XLSX, ZIP)
+  const allowedTypes = [
+    'application/pdf',
+    'application/vnd.dwg',
+    'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document',
+    'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet',
+    'application/zip'
+  ]
+  if (!allowedTypes.includes(file.mimetype)) {
+    throw new BadRequestException('Invalid file type')
+  }
+
+  // Extension check
+  const allowedExtensions = ['.pdf', '.dwg', '.docx', '.xlsx', '.zip']
+  const extension = path.extname(file.originalname).toLowerCase()
+  if (!allowedExtensions.includes(extension)) {
+    throw new BadRequestException('Invalid file extension')
+  }
+
+  return true
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] All user inputs validated with Zod (frontend) + class-validator (backend)
+- [ ] File uploads restricted (50MB max, whitelist types)
+- [ ] No direct use of user input in queries
+- [ ] Whitelist validation (not blacklist)
+- [ ] Error messages don't leak sensitive info
+
+### 3. SQL Injection Prevention
+
+#### FAIL: NEVER Concatenate SQL
+```typescript
+// DANGEROUS - SQL Injection vulnerability
+const query = `SELECT * FROM correspondences WHERE uuid = '${correspondenceUuid}'`
+await this.connection.query(query)
+```
+
+#### PASS: ALWAYS Use TypeORM Parameterized Queries
+```typescript
+// Safe - TypeORM parameterized query
+const correspondence = await this.correspondenceRepository.findOne({
+  where: { publicId: correspondenceUuid }
+})
+
+// Or with QueryBuilder
+const result = await this.correspondenceRepository
+  .createQueryBuilder('c')
+  .where('c.publicId = :uuid', { uuid: correspondenceUuid })
+  .getOne()
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] All database queries use TypeORM parameterized queries
+- [ ] No string concatenation in SQL
+- [ ] TypeORM query builder used correctly
+- [ ] Schema verified before writing queries (ADR-009)
+
+### 4. Authentication & Authorization (ADR-016)
+
+#### JWT Token Handling
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: localStorage (vulnerable to XSS)
+localStorage.setItem('token', token)
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: httpOnly cookies
+response.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
+  `token=${token}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=3600`
+)
+```
+
+#### Authorization Checks (CASL)
+```typescript
+// Controller with CASL guard
+@Post()
+@UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, RolesGuard, AbilitiesGuard)
+@CheckAbilities({ action: 'create', subject: 'Correspondence' })
+async create(@Body() dto: CreateCorrespondenceDto, @Request() req) {
+  // Service logic
+}
+```
+
+#### RBAC Matrix (ADR-016)
+- [ ] 4-Level RBAC matrix implemented (Admin, Manager, User, Viewer)
+- [ ] CASL AbilityFactory configured with correct permissions
+- [ ] JwtAuthGuard on all protected routes
+- [ ] RolesGuard for role-based access
+- [ ] AuditLogInterceptor on all mutation endpoints
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Tokens stored in httpOnly cookies (not localStorage)
+- [ ] Authorization checks before sensitive operations
+- [ ] CASL abilities configured correctly
+- [ ] Role-based access control implemented
+- [ ] Session management secure
+
+### 5. XSS Prevention
+
+#### Sanitize HTML
+```typescript
+import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify'
+
+// ALWAYS sanitize user-provided HTML
+function renderUserContent(html: string) {
+  const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {
+    ALLOWED_TAGS: ['b', 'i', 'em', 'strong', 'p'],
+    ALLOWED_ATTR: []
+  })
+  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: clean }} />
+}
+```
+
+#### Content Security Policy (Next.js)
+```typescript
+// next.config.js
+const securityHeaders = [
+  {
+    key: 'Content-Security-Policy',
+    value: `
+      default-src 'self';
+      script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline';
+      style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
+      img-src 'self' data: https:;
+      font-src 'self';
+      connect-src 'self' http://localhost:3001 https://192.168.10.8;
+    `.replace(/\s{2,}/g, ' ').trim()
+  }
+]
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] User-provided HTML sanitized
+- [ ] CSP headers configured
+- [ ] No unvalidated dynamic content rendering
+- [ ] React's built-in XSS protection used
+
+### 6. CSRF Protection
+
+#### CSRF Tokens
+```typescript
+import { csrf } from '@/lib/csrf'
+
+export async function POST(request: Request) {
+  const token = request.headers.get('X-CSRF-Token')
+
+  if (!csrf.verify(token)) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Invalid CSRF token' },
+      { status: 403 }
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Process request
+}
+```
+
+#### SameSite Cookies
+```typescript
+response.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
+  `session=${sessionId}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`
+)
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] CSRF tokens on state-changing operations
+- [ ] SameSite=Strict on all cookies
+- [ ] Double-submit cookie pattern implemented
+
+### 7. Rate Limiting (ADR-016)
+
+#### API Rate Limiting
+```typescript
+import { ThrottlerGuard } from '@nestjs/throttler'
+
+// Apply to auth endpoints
+@UseGuards(ThrottlerGuard)
+@Throttle({ default: { limit: 10, ttl: 60000 } })
+async login(@Body() dto: LoginDto) {
+  // Login logic
+}
+```
+
+#### Expensive Operations
+```typescript
+// Aggressive rate limiting for AI endpoints
+@Throttle({ default: { limit: 5, ttl: 60000 } })
+async extractMetadata(@Body() dto: ExtractMetadataDto) {
+  // AI extraction logic
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Rate limiting on all auth endpoints (ADR-016)
+- [ ] Rate limiting on AI endpoints (ADR-018/023)
+- [ ] IP-based rate limiting
+- [ ] User-based rate limiting (authenticated)
+
+### 8. Sensitive Data Exposure
+
+#### Logging
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: Logging sensitive data
+this.logger.log('User login:', { email, password })
+this.logger.log('Payment:', { cardNumber, cvv })
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: Redact sensitive data
+this.logger.log('User login:', { email, userId })
+this.logger.log('Payment:', { last4: card.last4, userId })
+```
+
+#### Error Messages (ADR-007)
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: Exposing internal details
+catch (error) {
+  return { error: error.message, stack: error.stack }
+}
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: Generic error messages
+catch (error) {
+  this.logger.error('Internal error:', error)
+  throw new BadRequestException('An error occurred. Please try again.')
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] No passwords, tokens, or secrets in logs
+- [ ] Error messages generic for users
+- [ ] Detailed errors only in server logs
+- [ ] No stack traces exposed to users
+
+### 9. AI Boundary Enforcement (ADR-018/023)
+
+#### FAIL: NEVER Do This
+```typescript
+// Direct AI access - FORBIDDEN
+import ollama from 'ollama'
+const response = await ollama.chat({ model: 'gemma4', messages })
+
+// Direct Qdrant access - FORBIDDEN
+import { QdrantClient } from '@qdrant/js-client-rest'
+const client = new QdrantClient({ url: 'http://localhost:6333' })
+```
+
+#### PASS: ALWAYS Do This
+```typescript
+// AI via DMS API only
+const response = await fetch('http://localhost:3001/api/ai/extract-metadata', {
+  method: 'POST',
+  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+  body: JSON.stringify({ documentId })
+})
+
+// Qdrant via DMS API only
+const response = await fetch('http://localhost:3001/api/ai/search', {
+  method: 'POST',
+  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+  body: JSON.stringify({ query, projectPublicId })
+})
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] AI processing on Admin Desktop only (Desk-5439)
+- [ ] No direct Ollama calls from backend/frontend
+- [ ] No direct Qdrant calls from backend/frontend
+- [ ] All AI interactions via DMS API endpoints
+- [ ] AI audit logging implemented (ADR-020)
+- [ ] Human-in-the-loop validation for AI outputs
+
+### 10. UUID Handling (ADR-019)
+
+#### FAIL: NEVER Do This
+```typescript
+// parseInt on UUID - FORBIDDEN
+const projectId = parseInt(projectUuid) // "0195..." → 19 (WRONG!)
+
+// Number on UUID - FORBIDDEN
+const projectId = Number(projectUuid)
+
+// + operator on UUID - FORBIDDEN
+const projectId = +projectUuid
+
+// id ?? '' fallback - FORBIDDEN
+const value = c.publicId ?? c.id ?? ''
+```
+
+#### PASS: ALWAYS Do This
+```typescript
+// Use UUID string directly
+const projectId = projectUuid // "019505a1-7c3e-7000-8000-abc123def456"
+
+// Backend: findOneByUuid returns entity with publicId
+const project = await this.projectService.findOneByUuid(projectUuid)
+const projectId = project.id // Internal INT for DB operations
+
+// Frontend: use publicId only
+interface ProjectOption {
+  publicId?: string; // No uuid fallback
+  projectName?: string;
+}
+const value = c.publicId // "019505a1-7c3e-7000-8000-abc123def456"
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] No `parseInt()` on UUID values
+- [ ] No `Number()` on UUID values
+- [ ] No `+` operator on UUID values
+- [ ] No `id ?? ''` fallback patterns
+- [ ] Use `publicId` (string UUID) in API responses
+- [ ] Internal INT `id` marked with `@Exclude()` in entities
+
+### 11. Dependency Security
+
+#### Regular Updates
+```bash
+# Check for vulnerabilities
+pnpm audit
+
+# Fix automatically fixable issues
+pnpm audit fix
+
+# Update dependencies
+pnpm update
+
+# Check for outdated packages
+pnpm outdated
+```
+
+#### Lock Files
+```bash
+# ALWAYS commit lock files
+git add pnpm-lock.yaml
+
+# Use in CI/CD for reproducible builds
+pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Dependencies up to date
+- [ ] No known vulnerabilities (pnpm audit clean)
+- [ ] Lock files committed
+- [ ] Regular security updates
+
+## Security Testing
+
+### Automated Security Tests
+
+```typescript
+// Test authentication
+test('requires authentication', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/correspondences')
+  expect(response.status).toBe(401)
+})
+
+// Test authorization
+test('requires admin role', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/admin/users', {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${userToken}` }
+  })
+  expect(response.status).toBe(403)
+})
+
+// Test input validation
+test('rejects invalid input', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/correspondences', {
+    method: 'POST',
+    body: JSON.stringify({ subject: '', recipientId: 'invalid' })
+  })
+  expect(response.status).toBe(400)
+})
+
+// Test rate limiting
+test('enforces rate limits', async () => {
+  const requests = Array(11).fill(null).map(() =>
+    fetch('/api/auth/login', { method: 'POST' })
+  )
+
+  const responses = await Promise.all(requests)
+  const tooManyRequests = responses.filter(r => r.status === 429)
+
+  expect(tooManyRequests.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+})
+```
+
+## Pre-Deployment Security Checklist
+
+Before ANY production deployment:
+
+- [ ] **Secrets**: No hardcoded secrets, all in env vars
+- [ ] **Input Validation**: All user inputs validated (Zod + class-validator)
+- [ ] **SQL Injection**: All queries parameterized (TypeORM)
+- [ ] **XSS**: User content sanitized
+- [ ] **CSRF**: Protection enabled
+- [ ] **Authentication**: Proper token handling (httpOnly cookies)
+- [ ] **Authorization**: RBAC + CASL checks in place
+- [ ] **Rate Limiting**: Enabled on auth and AI endpoints
+- [ ] **HTTPS**: Enforced in production
+- [ ] **Security Headers**: CSP, X-Frame-Options configured
+- [ ] **Error Handling**: No sensitive data in errors (ADR-007)
+- [ ] **Logging**: No sensitive data logged
+- [ ] **Dependencies**: Up to date, no vulnerabilities
+- [ ] **UUID Handling**: No parseInt/Number/+ on UUID (ADR-019)
+- [ ] **AI Boundary**: AI via DMS API only (ADR-018/023)
+- [ ] **File Uploads**: Validated (50MB max, whitelist types)
+- [ ] **AI Audit**: All AI interactions logged (ADR-020)
+
+## Resources
+
+- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
+- [NestJS Security](https://docs.nestjs.com/security)
+- [Next.js Security](https://nextjs.org/docs/security)
+- [ADR-016 Security Authentication](../../specs/06-Decision-Records/ADR-016-security-authentication.md)
+- [ADR-018 AI Boundary](../../specs/06-Decision-Records/ADR-018-ai-boundary.md)
+- [ADR-019 UUID Strategy](../../specs/06-Decision-Records/ADR-019-hybrid-identifier-strategy.md)
+- [ADR-023 AI Architecture](../../specs/06-Decision-Records/ADR-023-unified-ai-architecture.md)
+
+---
+
+**Remember**: Security is not optional. One vulnerability can compromise the entire platform. When in doubt, err on the side of caution.