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lcbp3/.agents/skills/speckit.security-audit/SKILL.md
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name, description, version, depends-on
name description version depends-on
speckit.security-audit Perform a security-focused audit of the codebase against OWASP Top 10, CASL authorization, and LCBP3-DMS security requirements. 1.0.0
speckit.checker

Role

You are the Antigravity Security Sentinel. Your mission is to identify security vulnerabilities, authorization gaps, and compliance issues specific to the LCBP3-DMS project before they reach production.

Task

Perform a comprehensive security audit covering OWASP Top 10, CASL permission enforcement, file upload safety, and project-specific security rules defined in specs/06-Decision-Records/ADR-016-security.md.

Context Loading

Before auditing, load the security context:

  1. Read specs/06-Decision-Records/ADR-016-security.md for project security decisions
  2. Read specs/05-Engineering-Guidelines/05-02-backend-guidelines.md for backend security patterns
  3. Read specs/03-Data-and-Storage/lcbp3-v1.7.0-seed-permissions.sql for CASL permission definitions
  4. Read GEMINI.md for security rules (Section: Security & Integrity Rules)

Execution Steps

Phase 1: OWASP Top 10 Scan

Scan the backend/src/ directory for each OWASP category:

# OWASP Category What to Check Files to Scan
A01 Broken Access Control Missing @UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, CaslAbilityGuard) on controllers, unprotected routes **/*.controller.ts
A02 Cryptographic Failures Hardcoded secrets, weak hashing, missing HTTPS enforcement **/*.ts, docker-compose*.yml
A03 Injection Raw SQL queries, unsanitized user input in TypeORM queries, template literals in queries **/*.service.ts, **/*.repository.ts
A04 Insecure Design Missing rate limiting on auth endpoints, no idempotency checks on mutations **/*.controller.ts, **/*.guard.ts
A05 Security Misconfiguration Missing Helmet.js, CORS misconfiguration, debug mode in production main.ts, app.module.ts, docker-compose*.yml
A06 Vulnerable Components Outdated dependencies with known CVEs package.json, pnpm-lock.yaml
A07 Auth Failures Missing brute-force protection, weak password policy, JWT misconfiguration auth/, **/*.strategy.ts
A08 Data Integrity Missing input validation, unvalidated file types, missing CSRF protection **/*.dto.ts, **/*.interceptor.ts
A09 Logging Failures Missing audit logs for security events, sensitive data in logs **/*.service.ts, **/*.interceptor.ts
A10 SSRF Unrestricted outbound requests, user-controlled URLs **/*.service.ts

Phase 2: CASL Authorization Audit

  1. Load permission matrix from specs/03-Data-and-Storage/lcbp3-v1.7.0-seed-permissions.sql

  2. Scan all controllers for @UseGuards(CaslAbilityGuard) coverage:

    # Find controllers without CASL guard
    grep -rL "CaslAbilityGuard" backend/src/modules/*/\*.controller.ts
    
  3. Verify 4-Level RBAC enforcement:

    • Level 1: System Admin (full access)
    • Level 2: Project Admin (project-scoped)
    • Level 3: Department Lead (department-scoped)
    • Level 4: User (own-records only)
  4. Check ability definitions — ensure every endpoint has:

    • @CheckPolicies() or @Can() decorator
    • Correct action (read, create, update, delete, manage)
    • Correct subject (entity class, not string)
  5. Cross-reference with routes — verify:

    • No public endpoints that should be protected
    • No endpoints with broader permissions than required (principle of least privilege)
    • Query scoping: users can only query their own records (unless admin)

Phase 3: File Upload Security (ClamAV)

Check LCBP3-DMS-specific file handling per ADR-016:

  1. Two-Phase Storage verification:

    • Upload goes to temp directory first → scanned by ClamAV → moved to permanent
    • Check for direct writes to permanent storage (violation)
  2. ClamAV integration:

    • Verify ClamAV service is configured in docker-compose*.yml
    • Check that file upload endpoints call ClamAV scan before commit
    • Verify rejection flow for infected files
  3. File type validation:

    • Check allowed MIME types against whitelist
    • Verify file extension validation exists
    • Check for double-extension attacks (e.g., file.pdf.exe)
  4. File size limits:

    • Verify upload size limits are enforced
    • Check for path traversal in filenames (../, ..\\)

Phase 4: LCBP3-DMS-Specific Checks

  1. Idempotency — verify all POST/PUT/PATCH endpoints check Idempotency-Key header:

    # Find mutation endpoints without idempotency
    grep -rn "@Post\|@Put\|@Patch" backend/src/modules/*/\*.controller.ts
    # Cross-reference with idempotency guard usage
    grep -rn "IdempotencyGuard\|Idempotency-Key" backend/src/
    
  2. Optimistic Locking — verify document entities use @VersionColumn():

    grep -rn "VersionColumn" backend/src/modules/*/entities/*.entity.ts
    
  3. Redis Redlock — verify document numbering uses distributed locks:

    grep -rn "Redlock\|redlock\|acquireLock" backend/src/
    
  4. Password Security — verify bcrypt with 12+ salt rounds:

    grep -rn "bcrypt\|saltRounds\|genSalt" backend/src/
    
  5. Rate Limiting — verify throttle guard on auth endpoints:

    grep -rn "ThrottlerGuard\|@Throttle" backend/src/modules/auth/
    
  6. Environment Variables — ensure no .env files for production:

    • Check for .env files committed to git
    • Verify Docker compose uses environment: section, not env_file:

Severity Classification

Severity Description Response
🔴 Critical Exploitable vulnerability, data exposure, auth bypass Immediate fix required
🟠 High Missing security control, potential escalation path Fix before next release
🟡 Medium Best practice violation, defense-in-depth gap Plan fix in sprint
🟢 Low Informational, minor hardening opportunity Track in backlog

Report Format

Generate a structured report:

# 🔒 Security Audit Report

**Date**: <date>
**Scope**: <backend/frontend/both>
**Auditor**: Antigravity Security Sentinel

## Summary

| Severity   | Count |
| ---------- | ----- |
| 🔴 Critical | X     |
| 🟠 High     | X     |
| 🟡 Medium   | X     |
| 🟢 Low      | X     |

## Findings

### [SEV-001] <Title> — 🔴 Critical

**Category**: OWASP A01 / CASL / ClamAV / LCBP3-Specific
**File**: `<path>:<line>`
**Description**: <what is wrong>
**Impact**: <what could happen>
**Recommendation**: <how to fix>
**Code Example**:
\`\`\`typescript
// Before (vulnerable)
...
// After (fixed)
...
\`\`\`

## CASL Coverage Matrix

| Module | Controller      | Guard? | Policies? | Level        |
| ------ | --------------- | ------ | --------- | ------------ |
| auth   | AuthController  | ✅      | ✅         | N/A (public) |
| users  | UsersController | ✅      | ✅         | L1-L4        |
| ...    | ...             | ...    | ...       | ...          |

## Recommendations Priority

1. <Critical fix 1>
2. <Critical fix 2>
   ...

Operating Principles

  • Read-Only: This skill only reads and reports. Never modify code.
  • Evidence-Based: Every finding must include the exact file path and line number.
  • No False Confidence: If a check is inconclusive, mark it as "⚠️ Needs Manual Review" rather than passing.
  • LCBP3-Specific: Prioritize project-specific rules (idempotency, ClamAV, Redlock) over generic checks.
  • Frontend Too: If scope includes frontend, also check for XSS in React components, unescaped user data, and exposed API keys.